Group contracting and enforcement
Authors/Editors
Research Areas
Publication Details
Output type: Journal article
Author list: Laffont JJ, N'Guessan T
Publisher: Mohr Siebeck
Publication year: 2001
Journal: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (0932-4569)
Volume number: 157
Issue number: 4
Start page: 487
End page: 498
Number of pages: 12
ISSN: 0932-4569
eISSN: 1614-0559
Languages: English-Great Britain (EN-GB)
Unpaywall Data
Open access status: closed
Abstract
We consider a principal-multiagent framework with adverse selection when contracting is possible ex ante. However, enforcement of contracts is imperfect, which results in inefficiencies. We study how group contracting may or may not mitigate those inefficiencies.
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