Corruption and concession renegotiations. Evidence from the water and transport sectors in Latin America

Authors / Editors

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Publication Details

Output type: Journal article

Author list: Guasch JL, Straub S

Publisher: Elsevier

Publication year: 2009

Journal: Utilities Policy (0957-1787)

Volume number: 17

Issue number: 2

Start page: 185

End page: 190

Number of pages: 6

ISSN: 0957-1787

eISSN: 1878-4356

Languages: English-Great Britain (EN-GB)

Unpaywall Data

Open access status: closed

Abstract

Numerous renegotiations have plagued water and transport concession contracts in Latin America. Using a panel dataset of over 300 concession contracts from Latin America between 1989 and 2000, we show that country-level corruption is a significant determinant of these renegotiations and that the effect of corruption varies depending on the type of renegotiations considered. While a more corrupt environment clearly leads to more firm-led renegotiations, it significantly reduces the incidence of government-led ones. The paper then discusses and tests the likely channels through which these different effects of corruption arise, looking in particular at the interactions between country-level corruption and relevant microeconomic institutions. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords

Concession contracts, LDCs, Regulation, Renegotiation

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