Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection

Authors / Editors

Research Areas

Publication Details

Output type: Journal article

Author list: Burkart M, Panunzi F

Publisher: Elsevier

Publication year: 2006

Journal: Journal of Financial Intermediation (1042-9573)

Volume number: 15

Issue number: 1

Start page: 1

End page: 31

Number of pages: 31

ISSN: 1042-9573

eISSN: 1096-0473

Languages: English-Great Britain (EN-GB)

Unpaywall Data

Open access status: green

Full text URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69547/1/Burkart_Agency%20conflicts%2C%20ownership%20concentration_author_2006%20LSERO.pdf

Abstract

This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords

corporate governance, law and finance, monitoring, ownership structure

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