Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms


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Publication Details

Output typeJournal article

Author listEllul A, Pagano M, Panunzi F

PublisherAmerican Economic Association

Publication year2010

JournalAmerican Economic Review (0002-8282)

Volume number100

Issue number5

Start page2414

End page2450

Number of pages37

ISSN0002-8282

eISSN1944-7981

LanguagesEnglish-Great Britain (EN-GB)


Unpaywall Data

Open access statusgreen

Full text URLhttp://www.csef.it/WP/wp204.pdf


Abstract

Entrepreneurs may be legally bound to bequeath a minimal stake to noncontrolling heirs. The size of this stake can reduce investment in family firms, by reducing the future income they can pledge to external financiers. Using a purpose-built indicator of the permissiveness of inheritance law and data for 10,004 firms from 38 countries in 1990-2006, we find that stricter inheritance law is associated with lower investment in family firms but does not affect investment in nonfamily firms. Moreover, as the model predicts, inheritance law affects investment only in family firms that experience a succession. (JEL G31, G32, K22, L26, O17).


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Last updated on 2025-09-07 at 03:01