The Transaction Cost Economics Theory of the Family Firm: Family-Based Human Asset Specificity and the Bifurcation Bias


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Publication Details

Output typeJournal article

Author listVerbeke A, Kano L

PublisherSAGE Publications

Publication year2012

JournalEntrepreneurship Theory and Practice (1042-2587)

Volume number36

Issue number6

Start page1183

End page1205

Number of pages23

ISSN1042-2587

eISSN1540-6520

LanguagesEnglish-Great Britain (EN-GB)


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Open access statusclosed


Abstract

We develop a transaction cost economics theory of the family firm, building upon the concepts of family-based asset specificity, bounded rationality, and bounded reliability. We argue that the prosperity and survival of family firms depend on the absence of a dysfunctional bifurcation bias. The bifurcation bias is an expression of bounded reliability, reflected in the de facto asymmetric treatment of family vs. nonfamily assets (especially human assets). We propose that absence of bifurcation bias is critical to fostering reliability in family business functioning. Our study ends the unproductive divide between the agency and stewardship perspectives of the family firm, which offer conflicting accounts of this firm type's functioning. We show that the predictions of the agency and stewardship perspectives can be usefully reconciled when focusing on how family firms address the bifurcation bias or fail to do so.


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Last updated on 2025-09-07 at 03:01